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POLITICAL CHANGE AND STABILITY

MEXICO'S POLITICAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND THE FAIRNESS OF ITS LEGAL SYSTEM
Boris Kozolchyk*
INTRODUCTION

Thoughtful Mexicans and non-Mexicans are increasingly calling
for a new fairness 4 political representation, and in the distribution
of resources as a means of restoring political stability and economic
growth. Yet, little attention is being paid to what has prompted the
inoperativeness or the failure of the existing standards of fairness in
Mexico's "official" law (or law in the books) and in its "living" law
(or law in action).' Similarly, no thought has been given to the process by which standards of fairness conducive to political stability
and sustained economic growth can be transformed into viable legal
institutions. This article will describe in summary fashion the operation of the most influential standards of fairness present in Mexico's official and living law, and suggest the need for a more efficient use of those standards that can contribute most to political
stability and growth.
I.

UNFAIRNESS IN SECTORAL AND MARGINAL ALLOCATION

Carlos G. Velez-Ibanez, a distinguished Mexican-American anthropologist, recently called attention to the observations of his National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) colleague
Larissa Lomnitz on sectoral allocation of resources in Mexico:
Although all social structures are hierarchical by definition, Mexican social structure can be understood metaphorically as a "set
of free-standing pyramids, each of which duplicates itself hierarchically like a crystal from top to bottom." Such a crystal is made
up of layers of relationships defined horizontally by class and ver* Professor, University of Arizona College of Law.
I.

See I ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L., 85-87 (1982), and 2 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.,

2-8 (1984) for an introductory discussion of living law.
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tically by the "sector" in which persons function."
According to Lomnitz, the vertical dimensions of Mexico's social
structure are made up of formal and informal sectors. The formal
sector is divided into the "public, private and labor" sectors. The
public sector includes governmental and quasi-governmental institutions. The private sector includes private enterprise and the liberal professions. The labor sector includes organized workers and
their institutions. Sectors not included among the formal categories
are informal or marginal. Despite the myth of universal access to
the formal sector, the reality, for large segments of the population
trapped in the informal sectors, is continued inequality and lack of
access to the shrinking resources available to the formal sectors.
Even in the greater federal district, traditionally the most promising of Mexico's urban meccas, the plight of the marginal sectors
appears to be approaching desperation. Consider the predicament
of street vendors and other informal providers of street services, including the rapidly increasing number of beggars in Mexico City.
In order to be allowed to "operate", they must share their daily
take with members of the police force. Such sharing makes the lawful survival of marginal members of urban society increasingly difficult. Indeed, a recent Mexico City newspaper report indicates that
the number of violent crimes has risen more than 300% in recent
months, over the already high levels.'
Velez-Ibanez offers a poor prognosis. Prevailing notions of fairness allow isolated individuals to become integrated into the formal
sectors. But, the sectors themselves and the resources that they control are closed to groups. Thus, "if any integration is possible, it
applies only to selected individuals . . . and in the case of political
participants, only to political leaders of local power structures and
not to the populations that they ostensibly represent.""
The rural picture is equally discouraging, especially for the marginal Indian population which is a significant segment of Mexico's
rural population. Dr. James Greenberg, a colleague of Velez-Ibanez
at the Bureau of Applied Research of the University of Arizona,
illustrates the plight of Chatino coffee growers in Oaxaca:
Where traditional access to land has been based on usufruct
rights and inheritance, this new form of land tenure, where rights
2. C. VELEZ-IBANEZ, RITUAL OF MARGINALITY 18, 29 (1983)
Ibanez).
3. Uno Mas Uno, Jan. 19, 1987, at 10.
4. C. VELEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 2, at 22.
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could be sold, in effect "disinherited" groups of people. As people
with money began to buy and accumulate land, the "disinherited"
were left with the feeling that the buyers had stolen the land from
them. Moreover, boundary conflicts abounded. Since corn was
planted with slash and burn techniques requiring long fallow periods, these new claims inevitably encroached on areas to which
other members of the community felt they had usufruct rights.'
While considerable

fortunes continue to be amassed by in-

termediaries such as coffee buyers, brokers, and lenders, the majority of coffee growers have failed to improve their economic condition and have often deteriorated financially. George Foster, a social
scientist quoted by Dr. Greenberg, describes the Mexican peasants'
view of the world as one in which all valuable or good things, such
as land and other forms of material wealth, but also friendship,
love, manliness, honor, respect, and influence are available only in
finite quantities. This view of the world and of trade inevitably
leads to conflict because rewards from coffee and other cash crops
are perceived as not being equitably shared. An individual or a
family is perceived as being able to improve its position only at the
expense of others. Whether Foster's description established exclusive causation between the world view and violent conflict is not
clear. However, it is indisputable that since the introduction of coffee growing and changes in traditional land tenure patterns in Oaxaca, the amount of violence has risen alarmingly. In one of the coffee growing districts studied by Dr. Greenberg, the homicide rate
has risen to five times the national average.
Mexico's official or written law cannot be blamed for the unfairness of social justice. Its 1917 Constitution was a trailblazer of social justice, pioneering the right to strike as well as a host of other
welfare rights, for the formal and informal sectors. Unlike the nineteenth-century laissez-faire counterparts, Mexico's 1927 Civil Code
allowed the rescission of contracts like those between the Chatinos
and their overreaching buyers, brokers, or lenders in the following
broad terms:
When any person, taking advantage of the supreme poverty of
another, obtains an excessive profit which is evidently disproportionate to the obligation assumed by him, the person damaged has
the right to demand rescission of the contract and, if this be im5. J. Greenberg, Our Struggle: Life and Violence in Rural Mexico 231-32 (Manuscript at the University of Arizona College of Law, Foreign Law Collection).
6. Id. at 245-46.
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These and other similarly worded enactments indicate that existing
unfairness in sectoral and marginal allocation of resources is not
caused by a lack of constitutional or statutory rules. Since rules and
principles of interpretation mandating a fairer allocation of resources do exist, attention must be directed to the application and
interpretation of these norms by government officials and courts.
The description of archetypal moral behavior, i.e. the behavior of
influential (albeit occasionally larger than life) models of decision
making, will be used as an analytical tool to establish the guiding
morality and its impact upon stability and growth.
A.

The PaternalisticAdministrator

Enrique Krauze is a keen observer of Mexico's governmental decision making. In a series of essays recently published in Mexico,
Mr. Krauze concludes that the ideology of Mexican administrative
or executive branch decisions is not that of nineteenth or twentiethcentury socialism but what he refers to as Neo-Thomistic statism,
adopted first by Porfirio Diaz and in revolutionary times by Venustiano Carranza:
Democracy is the government of high, profound and serene reason, that sensing the pulsations of national life . . . searches for
formulas to establish and maintain the balance of vital forces,
saving measures . . . useful reforms that can awaken pity, and
bring about liberation for those who will suffer. Democracy . . .
should not search for the majority (will) in the compromises of a
party system ... but in the representation of all classes and of all
legitimate interests.8
Contrasted with Francisco Madero's, Carranza's government was
not a representative form of democracy. The actual will of the majority was only valid and binding when filtered through the government's "profound and serene reason." This reason, as the concept
of justice in the Summa Theologica, aims at and is measured by
the common good. The party system and the electoral process are
ancillary to the implementation of the revolutionary mandate to
search for reforms or formulas that would balance the interests of
the "haves" and the "have nots". Krauze quoted the recently deceased Jesus Reyes Heroles for the confirmatory aphorism that in
7.
8.

MEXICAN CIVIL CODE 4 (M.W. Gordon tran. 1980).
E. KRAUZE, POR UNA DEMOCRACIA SIN ADJETIVOS il
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Mexican politics, "form is the substance." Stated simply, the political process must provide the availability of power for those designated by the revolutionary party to govern. This has been accomplished by the administrator acting as an archetypal good father
with profound and serene reason, for the common good. The institutional consequences for Mexico of this paternalistic version of
statism are readily apparent.
In Mexico, political power is centralized in the executive branch.
Centralization has allowed unipersonal decision making that forever seems to be courting authoritarianism. The paternalistic ruler
is deemed wise, all powerful and mindful of the common good. He
is also frequently magnanimous toward his defeated opponents,
particularly if his integrity and dignity have not been attacked. He
rewards loyal and obedient friends, but disloyalty or contempt are
often considered equivalent to serious crimes or misdemeanors.
This paternalistic reliance upon loyalty and personal friendship is
reflected by a system in which goods or services needed by public
entities are usually provided by those closest to the rulers. Eventually, a symbiotic relationship developed between the public and private sectors for the abuse of paternalistic privileges. They have become interdependent and in certain vital industries wield political
power jointly.
B.

The Venal Administrator

The morality of the venal administrator stems from what he perceives as good for himself, his immediate family and closest friends.
Purchases are made and public works are undertaken by the venal
administrator whenever profitable for himself or for those closest to
him. In this context, the bribe taken by the venal administrator is
nothing more than a sale of a family or friendly privilege to a
stranger, i.e., someone who is neither a close relative nor a friend.
In real life, the paternalistic and the venal administrator are
often one (although Krauze claims that the number of venal administrators grew precipitously since the 1950s), and his decisions,
whether inspired by paternalism or venality, are seldom inspired by
"marketplace" considerations. As a paternalistic administrator, he
seeks no counsel from genuine electoral mandates, nor does he allow cost effectiveness to interfere with his favorite course of action.
Ultimately what counts is his profound and serene reason, a reason
that he often uses to persuade or co-opt "sensitive" sectors such as
labor, peasants or students.
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The loss of administrative efficiency caused by both paternalistic
and venal administrators is an obvious cost of applying their standards of fairness to the allocation and distribution of public resources. Less obvious, but now becoming clearer to observers such
as Enrique Krauze, is that the increasingly competitive and costefficient international marketplace faced by developed and developing nations alike has no room for such a costly and inefficient administration. Inevitably, both types of administrators become dependent upon foreign lenders or providers for their own, and
Mexico's economic lifelines. Also, as the resource pie becomes
smaller the number of honest paternalistic administrators is declining while the number of venal administrators is rising. In fact, as it
becomes harder to earn a livelihood, the loyalty of subordinates is
ensured by allowing them to profit from, or share in, the profits of
their venal superiors.
C. The Letter of the Law Judge
The letter of the law judge takes his clues of what is fair from a
literal reading of written texts. He is comfortable with narrow rules
and uncomfortable with general or "super-eminent" principles. If a
literal reading of statutory language leads to a clearly inequitable
result, this judge does not apply the principles of fairness and good
faith found in the Constitution or in the Civil Code to mitigate the
inequity. Similarly, this judge reads contractual stipulations literally even when the literal meaning of a term or stipulation conflicts
with its customary or trade meaning, or with the meaning used by
the parties in their course of dealing. For example, in a case where
plaintiff contended that he was entitled to the monetary value of
the currency he had lent, as determined at the time of the maturity
of the loan, and should not suffer the severe loss that resulted from
a devaluation which took place later, at the time of collection, the
Supreme Court responded:
[e]xcept in those cases where the law authorizes resort to equitable principles . . . (this court) cannot apply such principles because it would violate the principle of equality before the law,
which is the basis of social order. As long as there are legal provisions applicable to the case in question there is no reason to attempt to correct them, thereby substituting the legislative by another, entirely subjective will. 9
9.

"[TIhe rise and fall of rates of exchange and their effects upon payment is an eco-

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol18/iss1/15

6

Kozolchyk: POLITICAL POLITICAL
CHANGE CHANGE
AND STABILITY:
Mexico's Political Stability, Eco
AND STABILITY

In a brilliant critique of this type of reasoning Professor E. Garcia
Maynez ° showed how an equitable inquiry into the parties' true
intent was consistent with legislative intent. One should add that
Mexico's Supreme Court's fears about the inherent subjectivity and
arbitrariness of equitable determinations are unfounded. Contrary
to the Court's view, equity is organically connected to the determination of a contextual, as opposed to a literal or dictionary, meaning of terms. As long as a court resorts to objective tools for the
determination of legislative or contractual intent, such as legislative
history or parole evidence, or trade custom and usage, it need not
fear arbitrariness.
D.

The Venal Judge

The venal judge, like the venal administrator places personal
profit making above all other considerations. Often he becomes the
beneficiary of the litigants' bidding for favorable rulings. If one of
the parties has the superior political or economic power he will win.
If the two parties have a relatively similar political or economic
power, or if one party matches the other's greater political influence
with his larger purse, then the bidding, and the stalemate, are on.
According to Professor Raul Cervantes Ahumada, this method of
dealing with judicial disputes is not unusual when one takes into
account not only the parties' but also their attorneys' connections.
It accounts for the low esteem in which the Mexican people now
hold much of the judicial system.11 This is not to say that Mexico's
judiciary is wholly corrupt or that honest justice is not available in
Mexico. Mexico still has a good number of honest, courageous and
wise judges. It is to say that their integrity and wisdom are often
neutralized by their venal, and letter of the law colleagues, and that
it is the latter's behavior which influences public attitudes toward
judicial adjudication.
In view of the influence exerted by letter of the law and venal
justice, it is pertinent to inquire into its impact upon stability and
growth. One of the most distinctive features of letter of the law and
nomic phenomenon which is independent of the legal necessity to fix, as of the initiation of
the lawsuits, the quantum of the claim." Gerhard Karras y Cia v. Friendemberg S.A., 5
REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO Y JURISPRUDENCIA 116 (1934). See also Kozolchyk, Fairness in Anglo-American and Latin American Commercial Adjudication, 2 B.C. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV., 219, 244 (1979) [hereafter Fairness].
10. 5 REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO Y JURISPRUDENCIA, 127 (1934).
II. R. Cervantes Ahumada, Salvemos ala Suprema Corte El Sol de Mexico, Feb. 6,
1986, at 5-17.
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venal justice is its factual aloofness. A student of these decisions
can seldom find a connection between, the litigated issues and ratio
decidendi, and the facts that led to the dispute. For example, a
buyer sues his seller because the latter was unwilling to deliver a
commodity at a certain stipulated price in a written sale agreement.
The defendant, however, will not answer the complaint alleging
what actually happened, i.e., an unexpected dramatic rise in the
price of the commodity as a result of an unforeseen devaluation.
Since the letter of the law does not expressly authorize the application of the equitable doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, defendant's
lawyer will rely on hypertechnical defenses. These defenses are usually procedural, and they often revolve around the attorneys' powers to litigate as found in their respective powers of attorney, or the
parties' power to act in a corporate capacity, as found in the corporate books and records. Hence, the final decision, if it is ever
handed down, will not address the question of who, between a
buyer or seller of commodities, must bear the risk of monetary devaluation in the absence of an express contractual stipulation. Instead, it will address issues of proper formalities for issuance of
powers of attorney or for the introduction into evidence of minutes
of the meetings of boards of directors. Hence, an attorney counselling a client considering a long-term commodity contract will
search in vain for judicial guidance.
The impact of inequitable and unpredictable rules on business
planning is quite costly. The volume as well as the quality of desirable trade and investment suffer when traders and investors are not
guided by rules based in principles of honest and fair dealing. Contrary to conventional wisdom in the Middle Ages (and in the Iberian peninsula and Latin America until almost our time) commerce
is not a vile tricky, "winner take all, loser take none" occupation."a
Successful commerce requires considerable trust in the honesty and
skill of close associates and financial intermediaries such as banks,
insurance companies' carriers, warehousemen, agents, and brokers.
In addition, successful commerce imposes upon regular participants
in market transactions a morality that enables cooperation for mutual profitability. This morality of cooperation must be supported
by the legal system and especially by the adjudication of commer12. See Fairness, supra note 9 at 255-56; see also Kozolchyk Commercialization of
Civil Law and Civilization of Commercial Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 3, 16-27 (1979); MORALITY
AND THE DYNAMICS OF COMMERCIAL LAW, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 15 (D. King ed., Rothman, 1986).
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cial controversies. A marketplace unsure of its morality or inclined
to a "winner take all, loser take none" attitude is particularly dependent upon decisional rules to draw the line of permissibility. The
absence of such a line encourages transactions that are profitable
and productive only for those who have the power to manipulate
the outcome and discourages access to the marketplace by new or
weaker competitors.
In the marketplace of political activity the judiciary's failure to
limit or curb administrative malfeasance carries an equally high
political stability price. Once courts are perceived as unable to correct political abuses, ideologies become more radical, and the call
to violence or to military type solutions increases.
II.

WHAT TO

Do?

Cervantes Ahumada, Krauze, Greenberg and Velez-Ibanez agree
that there is a generalized distrust for legal institutions in Mexico.
Trust, however, can only be earned by satisfying the expectations of
fairness of those using legal institutions. At a minimum, the user
must be reassured that by relying on the fairness of, for example, a
contract, a share of stock or of an electoral process, he will not,
inevitably, give up something in exchange for nothing. This does
not mean that each party to a commercial or political bargain must
receive the same mathematically ascertained value that he gave.
Despite laudable efforts by moral philosophers from Aristotle's to
John Rawles' time, there is no logical formula that insures a universally fair outcome, either in "distributive" or "corrective" justice
disputes. There are, however, standards of fairness uniformly used
by different societies in developing viable market economies. 3 The
first standard (Fl) is based upon a brotherly type of morality. It
requires that the party with the dominant bargaining power or skill
treat the other party as if he were his dependent and cared-for
brother. This may require that the dominant party refrain from
profit making or absorb the weaker party's losses. This standard
was applied to many of the controversies between Jewish and Arab
traders from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries in Mediterranean
trade and was responsible for these traders' ability to entrust
money and wares over long distances without having to accompany
them.1 4 F1 duties were in large measure religiously inspired and
13.
14.

See Fairness, supra note 9, at 220, 233, 257.
Id. at 220 et seq.
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were responsible for a degree of commercial trust unavailable
among other traders in continental Europe. Variants of F1 are apparent since that time in societies with developed financial markets
and are imposed typically on financial intermediaries acting in a
fiduciary capacity for weaker or less knowledgeable parties.
The second standard (F2) is based upon a cooperative market
morality and it assumes equality of bargaining and knowledge. It
requires that one party treat the other the same way a regular participant in that market transaction would want to be treated when
viewing his own advantage. Thus, while it does not require that one
party absorb the other's losses, it requires that each party refrain
from interfering with the other party's ability to profit. The requirement that a merchant owed another a minimum amount of cooperation became apparent in the so-called law merchant, a law that
emerged from commercial fair courts and courts in leading commercial centers particularly in Renaissance Europe. As the professional markets gave way to participation by consumers or nonprofessional merchants the cooperative duties of merchants toward
non-merchants became stricter. F2 is the most widely applied standard of fairness in the law of societies with developed market
economies.1 5
The third standard (F3) is found predominantly in the law of
developing nations and is based on an exclusionary tribal morality
of fairness. It assumes that duties of an F1 type are owed to the
members of one's own tribe, family, or close friends, but it negates
F1 and F2 duties with respect to nonmembers of the exclusive
group. It is a standard characteristic of primitive societies or societies whose survival is constantly threatened by outsiders or strangers. Accordingly, a stranger can be treated in any manner the
dominant party can get away with.
F3 is frequently applied by courts in developing nations to private law disputes. As long as the dominant party obtained the
weaker party's formal consent it does not matter that the latter received nothing or little in exchange for the value or benefit conferred on the former. If the weaker party literally agrees to receive
what he got, or the law literally interpreted, does not require a
marketlike reciprocity or brotherly care, he has no cause of
action."0
It is not difficult to see why Fl and F2 contributed most to the
15.
16.

Id. at 233 et seq.
Id. at 257 et seq.
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development of trusted legal institutions in nations with developed
market economies. Banking, insurance, long distance carriage, and
warehousing, as well as the public sale of corporate securities, owe
their viability to the reassurance provided by fiduciary and cooperative duties toward perfect strangers. Conversely, if the strangers'
monies, goods or services would have been handled in accordance
with F3, no stranger would have been willing to entrust his assets to
another stranger.
The importance of public perceptions of the prevalence of F3 in
developing nations is illustrated by a capital formation study conducted almost two decades ago in Costa Rica. When respondents
were asked why they did not invest in a highly profitable industrial
concern that had an uninterrupted record of dividend distributions
and a higher return on capital than that of real estate mortgages,
their response was nearly unanimous: "if it is such a good investment, why would the corporation or the people running it want to
share it with us (strangers), rather than with their families or close
friends."7
In contrast with the widespread distrust for marketplace, and official political and legal institutions, social scientists have found
considerable trust in some non-official institutions of developing nations. For example, Velez-Ibanez' and Karon's studies on some of
the poorest areas of Mexico City18 point to the presence of active
credit networks based upon reciprocity. Similarly, highly trusting
relationships transcend the traditional compadrazgo and have
arisen in urban political associations. Greenberg's work on the Chatinos in Oaxaca reveals a similar pattern in rural communities. He
compares the exploitation by coffee buyers and money lenders with
the "indigenous order based upon mutual cooperation and communal property in which coalitions between peasants underwrite individual and family security by emphasizing obligations of
reciprocity."' 9
It is true that these informal associations are based upon trust in
select members of the community, such as the respected widow who
manages the community loan fund, or the village elder who collects
and distributes the "saint's money." It is also true that the trust
17. Kozolchyk, Toward a Theory of Law in Economic Development, The Costa Rican
USAID-Rocap Law Reform Project LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER 681, 713 (1971).
18. VELEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 2 at 9; Karon, Law and Popular Credit in Mexico, 1
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L., 89, 92, 102 (1982).
19. Greenberg, supra note 5 at 18.
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involved in the contemporary versions of F1 and F2 is largely a
trust in impersonal legal institutions whether in the form of a savings account, an insurance policy, or share of stock. Yet the transition from a purely personal to an impersonal, institutional type of
trust seems to have been effected more easily where the emerging
institution was identified with respected members of the community
or with their trade associations."
Institutional trust must take place at the communal grassroots; it
cannot be legislated or imposed from above. Changes at the grassroots do not happen overnight or in cataclysmic fashion. They involve a protracted trial and error process with transactions that
blend easily with the physical and cultural setting, but which also
contain the seeds of new relationships, values, and methods of
operation.
A grassroots process of economic and legal enfranchisements, if
sufficiently widespread, will encourage the growth of democratic institutions that lie beneath the surface of non-official associations. In
addition, it will reinforce the need for pluralistic decision making.
It is not by accident that the development of pluralistic institutions
in Western societies came hand in hand with the legal and economic enfranchisement of large segments of the productive population. After all, true appreciation of one's freedoms can only occur
when one realizes the significance of these freedoms to one's rights
or duties. If one is not subject to such rights or duties, or if such
rights or duties cannot be related to actual people or things, they
remain as meaningless entities in the minds of the disenfranchised.
Clearly, the preceding suggestions do not entail a grandiose solution or set of solutions to Mexico's political and economic problems.
At best, they are an attempt to cope with one of the aspects of
instability and stagnation. Yet this should not disturb those who
have identified the grandiose solution of "profound and serene reason" as one of the main causes of these problems. In fact, Krauze,
among other Mexican political scientists, counsels a "philosophy of
small things to enrich the fertile soil of Mexico's local communities,
which are its traditional sources of strength."'"
Lawyers, in conjunction with social scientists, can make a significant contribution to the search for the "small things" that could
help develop trustworthy market institutions. Assume, for example,
20.

See generally F. BRAUDEL, II,CIVILIZATION
433-53 especially at 449 (1982).
KRAUZE, supra note 8, at 29.

AND CAPITALISM, THE WHEELS OF

COMMERCE

21.
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that a rural credit union is created to help the Chatino Indians gain
greater self-sufficiency by financing the production and distribution
of their coffee or handicrafts. Lawyers using solely their traditional
skills would participate in selecting the appropriate type of association, in documenting the decision-making process, the loan and collection procedures and so on. Unlike the traditional lawyers, however, those involved in the credit union project would have to be
trained observers of the behavior of highly respected community
leaders in order to ascertain what makes them trustworthy and effective. Thus, development lawyers would have to learn how to reconcile the customary or living law institutions they find with the
operational needs of a for-profit credit union. This requires a careful monitoring of adopted procedures in order to determine what
works, what does not, and why. The purpose of these non-traditional legal tasks, then, is to help fashion a living law of rural credit
which is both sensitive to the grassroots sources of trustworthiness
and to the unavoidable requirements of F1 and F2.
The growing consensus among thinking Mexicans is that the
time for empty rhetoric is long gone. The growing consensus among
thinking Americans is that the fate of Mexico is, increasingly,
America's own. The traditional meaning of the shared border is being changed by ever growing family, friendship, cultural, economic,
and national security ties. Mexico's instability and economic stagnation are, therefore, in the deepest sense the United States' as
well. Hopefully, students of the law, both official and living, in both
countries will realize that a significant legal problem has been identified, and that it can best be tackled by sharing complementary
resources and skills.
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